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EPILEPSY AND THE ALTERNATIVES
FOR A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Epilepsy has been long recognized but little understood. This lack of understand-
ing has hampered attorneys faced with an epileptic client in formulating an appro-
priate criminal defense. In examining the pathological aspects of epilepsy, the au-
thor discusses the subtleties that make even a broad definition difficult. He then
analyzes the alternative criminal defenses and their potential application to indi-
viduals manifesting various types of epilepsy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH DOCTORS at one time believed there was a significant re-
lationship between epilepsy and violent criminal behavior,1 the clear
weight of authority is now to the contrary. 2 The epileptic is no more prone
to crimes of violence than is the nonepileptic. 3 Nevertheless, the various
forms of epileptic seizures and their aftermaths produce conditions in which
1. Interest in the relationship between epilepsy and crime dates back at least as far as 1830
when clinicians turned increasingly to epilepsy as an explanation for crime after Esquirol de-
lineated a condition referred to as "masked epilepsy," which was manifested by mental au-
tomatism rather than the "ordinary" grand mal epileptic seizure. J. ESQUIROL, MENTAL
MALADIES: A TREATISE ON INSANITY 161-62 (E.K. Hunt transl. 1845). Public distrust of epilep-
tics climaxed in 1891 with the theory of the "epileptoid criminal condition." C. LoMBROSO, THE
MAN OF GENIUS (1891). See also G. LOMBROSO-FERRERO, CRIMINAL MAN, ACCORDING TO
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CESARE LoMBROSO 16 (1911). Lombroso, after studying several
criminals-a brutal rapist, an infamous robber, and a young soldier who slew eight of his
comrades-concluded that epileptics had a natural criminal propensity. The identification of
epilepsy with depravity can be found as late as the twentieth century. Note the reference to
epilepsy by Bianchi, the Italian psychiatrist, in speaking of mania: "In the typical and severer
form [of mania] (furor) . . . the desire for violent destruction [is] accentuated . . . resembling
somewhat the excited and sinister mind of the epileptic." L. BIANCHI, A TEXT-BOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 766 (1906). Such generalizations, however, have been widely criticized.
2. M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 164 (1952). But see W.
BROMBERG, CRIME AND THE MIND: A PSYCHIATRIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
133-36 (1965), citing Amati & Ragozino, The Epileptic Personality and Its Criminologic and
Forensic--Psychiatric Aspects, 3 FOLIA PSYCHIATRIA 269 (1963); Podolsky, The Epileptic Mur-
derer, 30 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 176 (1962); Stevenson, Psychomotor Epilepsy Associated With
Criminal Behavior, 10 MED. J. AusTL. 784 (1963).
3. R. BARROW & H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 128-29 (2d ed. 1966); W. BROM-
BERG, supra note 2, at 136; S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 161
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the epileptic, though capable of action, is subject to mental disturbance
ranging from mild confusion to complete unconsciousness. 4 If the epileptic
engages in conduct considered to be criminal during or immediately after a
seizure, his mental condition may be an exculpatory circumstance, important
to his defense.
Since epilepsy is not uncommon, 5 an attorney faces a real possibility of
representing an epileptic defendant. The most significant danger in such a
situation is the tendency to oversimplify. Epilepsy is not always manifested
by the dramatic grand mal convulsions familiar to the layman.6 Rather, it is
a generic term for the numerous and diverse manifestations which comprise
(1967); Knox, Epileptic Automatism and Violence, 8 MED. Sci. & L. 96 (1968); Livingston,
Epilepsy and Murder, 188 J.A.M.A. 172 (1964); Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law
and Medicine, 1 CLINICS 1353, 1375-79 (1943); 18 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 450, 457-61 (1943);
Smith, Medico-Legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31 TEX. L. REV. 765, 767 (1953).
Studies conducted in various institutions sometimes suggest a link between epilepsy and
violent crime. For example, the incidence of epilepsy in a hospital for the criminally insane was
found to be 6.8%, but that figure is 10 times higher than the incidence of epilepsy among
American servicemen during World War I. J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL:
A GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL COURTS 111 (1958); Lennox,
Amnesia, Real and Feigned, 99 AM. J. PSYCH. 732, 738 (1943); 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 298, 306
(1943).
Such generalizations have been criticized, undoubtedly with merit, on the grounds that
they are founded upon highly unrepresentative studies of institutionalized subjects. Such indi-
viduals may well have been affected by other mental diseases and defects, as well as by the
massive deterioration which often accompanies lengthy institutionalization. ERNST, OBER
CEWALTrATICKEITSVERBRECHER UND IHRE NACHKOMMEN (Violent Criminals and Their Off-
spring), cited in Smith, Medico-Legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31 TEX. L. REV. 765, 767 n.7 (1953).
Other studies have indicated that epileptics are, in fact, less frequently connected to crimi-
nal activity than nonepileptics. Referring to the common generalization that epileptics have a
tendency to expose themselves during automatisms, Dr. Norwood East commented that, of 150
cases of sexual exhibitionism studied by him, "[it is of some interest ... that none of the 150
cases were due to epilepsy. A student is taught the connection between epileptic automatism
and exhibitionism. This occurs occasionally ... [blut it would appear that the cases are not as
frequent as they are dramatic." N. EAST, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CRIME ch. 6 (1936).
4. See notes 34, 48, 70-72 infra and accompanying text.
5. Because of the many diverse forms of epilepsy, it is extremely difficult to accurately
make any estimate of its incidence. The problem is further complicated by the fact that epilepsy
is not necessarily a lifelong condition. Furthermore, many cases undoubtedly go unreported,
owing to the social stigma still attached to the ailment despite medical advances in knowledge
and treatment.
The number of epileptics in the United States has been estimated to be as low as 700,000.
A. NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 261 (7th ed. 1968). AS high and broad a range as
800,000 to 1,500,000 has also been suggested. Fabing & Barrow, Medical Discovery as a Legal
Catalyst: Modernization of Epilepsy Laws to Reflect Medical Progress, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 42,
43 (1955). An often quoted estimate is that one person out of every 200 is an epileptic. See,
e.g., Glasgow, Some Medico-Legal Aspects of Epilepsy, 36 N.Z.L.J. 277 (1960). A recent esti-
mate that there are 1,860,000 epileptics in the United States, however, indicates that the
malady is twice as prevalent. B. MILLER & C. KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE AND NURSING 327 (1972).
6. At the mention of seizures, "one generally thinks of loss of consciousness, violent jerking
movements, and foaming at the mouth-the behavior observed when a person has a grand mal
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the affliction. From a legal perspective, although the insanity defense ap-
pears readily available, there are a number of alternative defenses.
This Note will examine the pathological aspects of epilepsy and analyze
its potential as a defense to a criminal action. It will detail the difficult task
of establishing the disease's existence and its effect upon the defendant. The
alternative criminal defenses and their potential application to epileptics will
also be studied.
II. THE GENERAL NATUr. OF EPILEPSY
A. Definition
Although the affliction has been recognized for thousands of years, 7 there
is as yet no comprehensive legal definition of epilepsy.8 Early cases charac-
terized it as equivalent to what laymen termed "fits," 9 and as a disease of
the brain involving convulsions. 10 In one rather colorful case, it was inaccu-
rately described as "a state of insanity, during which the patient is deprived
of reason and judgment; but he is at the same time deprived of sense and
consciousness, and is wholly incapable of doing any thing."" The courts
have also taken judicial notice of the fact that epilepsy is hereditary, 12
though this is now disputed.13
Statutes employing the term epilepsy have generally failed to define it.' 4
In Ohio an epileptic was once referred to tautologically as one having
epilepsy.' 5 Possibly the best attempt at statutory definition, however, was
made by the New York legislature in a now-defunct statute which stated that
seizure. This picture is incomplete, for not all seizures are visible. There are gradations of
seizures, as well as different types and causes." Bruya & Bolin, Epilepsy: A Controllable Dis-
ease, 76 AMi. J. NURSING 388 (1976).
7. In ancient Rome epilepsy was referred to as morbus sacer, the sacred disease, and later
as morbus demoniacus, because the epileptic was believed to be controlled by demons. It was
also known as morbus comitiales, the disease of the assembly, because when a man was struck
by a seizure in a comitum, "business was at once suspended, for the superstitious Romans
looked upon epilepsy as a visitation from the gods. In Roman law, this condition was described
as Morbus Sonticus, the. serious disease, and one that exempted its victims from public duties
and responsibilities." Ruskin, Medico-Legal Aspects of Epilepsy, 13 DISEASES NERVOUS Sys.
166 (1952), citing Chapin, A Consideration of the Epileptic by the Courts, 10 MEDICINE 112-15
(1904). Other early authorities ascribed the ailment to vapors and humours which emanated
from the body. B. MALOY, NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES 265 (1935).
8. Note, The Legal Problems of Epilepsy, 29 T)EmP. L.Q. 364, 365 (1956).
9. Westphall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. App. 734, 740, 151 P. 159, 162 (1915).
10. Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 804, 811, 191 S.E. 479, 485 (1937).
11. Lawton v. The Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Mass. 500, 517 (1848).
12. Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 244, 61 A. 604, 604 (1905).
13. A. NOYES, supra note 5, at 262.
14. See note 8 supra.
15. Omo REV. CODE § 5125.14 (repealed 1961).
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an epileptic is "a person suffering from epilepsy as defined in medical prac-
tice, to such an extent that for his own welfare and the welfare of others, or
of the community, he requires care and treatment." 1 6 Such an open-ended
definition may be unavoidable, and can be both realistic and useful in the
case of epilepsy, 7 since rapid advances in medical knowledge would soon
render a rigid definition obsolete. Another solution has been to use a
broader definition which encompasses other diseases as well as epilepsy.18
Shifting the responsibility for defining epilepsy to the medical profession,
however, as did the New York statute, 19 may not solve the problem either.
Throughout the last century neurologists have struggled to formulate a defin-
ition, but as yet no satisfactory description has been able to incorporate all
the known data.2 0  The older medical dictionaries depicted epilepsy as a
paroxysmal 2 ' hereditary disease causing deterioration of the brain over a
lengthy period of time.2 2  Significant portions of this definition, however,
have been sharply disputed, modified, or discarded. 23 Most doctors have
come to agree that epilepsy should not even be considered a "disease," but
rather a collection of symptoms. 2 4
Relying upon an earlier definition,2 5 Dr. Irwin Perr has fdrmulated a
broad description of epilepsy as "a disease or symptom complex charac-
terized by recurrent alterations in the state of consciousness with or without
muscular movements, accompanied by an electrical discharge in the brain-
with certain exceptions." 26 This definition recognizes both positions in the
disease/symptom controversy.2 7 It includes mere "alterations" of conscious-
16. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 2(10) (repealed 1972). This section was replaced, how-
ever, and epilepsy would now apparently be subsumed under the definitions of mental disabil-
ity and/or mental illness. Id. at § 1.05 (McKinney 1976).
17. Perr, Epilepsy and the Law, 7 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 280, 281 (1958).
18. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 4507.08 (Page 1972) ('any condition which causes episodic
impairment of consciousness or a loss of muscular control"). See also note 16 supra.
19. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
20. Glasgow, supra note 5.
21. Paroxysmal: Recurring in sudden spasms or seizures. DOR.AND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 1141 (25th ed. 1974). See also BLAKISTON's NEW GOULD MEDICAL DIc-
TIONARY 871 (2d ed. 1956).
22. 2 WOOD, PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 748, quoted in Aurentz v. Anderson, 3 Pitts. R. 310,
313-14 (1871).
23. A. NOYES, supra note 5, at 262, 270-71.
24. Id. at 259. Rose, Criminal Responsibility and Competency As Influenced by Organic
Disease, 35 Mo. L. REV. 326, 343-44 (1970). The justification for this change appears to be that
since the cause, form, and severity of epileptic seizures can be so diverse and dissimilar, the
title "epilepsy" can be retained only as a generic term for the manifestations which may evi-
dence the condition.
25. A "functional disorder characterized by recurrent attacks of loss of consciousness, with
or without convulsive movement." H. MERRITT, A TEXTBOOK OF NEUROLOGY 637 (1955).
26. Perr, supra note 17.
27. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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ness (as opposed to loss of consciousness) and allows for the presence or
absence of convulsions. Such a broad definition appears necessary in order
to encompass all the various forms and degrees of epilepsy. Overbreadth,
however, will result in the inclusion of some nonepileptic conditions.2 8 In
order to avoid this, Dr. Perr must recognize exceptions.
A concise definition, however, may create other problems. Dr. William
A.N. Dorland, author of one of the most widely quoted definitions, 29 stated
that epilepsy is a "chronic, ftinctional 3 ° disease characterized by brief con-
vulsive seizures in which there is loss of consciousness, with [a sequence of]
tonic31 and clonic 32 convulsions." 33 Whereas Dr. Perr's definition is over-
inclusive, Dr. Dorland's statement is underinclusive, since it would exclude
conditions which certainly fall within the scope of epilepsy and yet which do
not cause unconsciousness 34 or convulsions3 5 (tonic or clonic).
Perhaps the best solution to the definitional problem will be to recognize
that any definition is necessarily imprecise, and to attempt, instead, to de-
scribe the condition itself, classifiing it according to its specific manifesta-
tions.
28. E.g., insulin shock, fainting, alcohol or drug intoxication, and hysteria.
29. THE AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (22d ed. 1951), cited in Smith,
Medico-Legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31 TEx. L. REv. 765, 766 (1953); Note, The Legal Problems of
Epilepsy, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 364 (1956).
30. It is conventional medical practice to classify diseases as either organic or functional.
The former are those diseases with a demonstrable pathology; i.e., structural changes in the
organs or tissues of the body. Functional diseases, on the other hand, are those without a
demonstrable pathology; i.e., no anatomic, biochemical or physiological abnormality. BLAKIS-
TON'S NEW COULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 356, 358 (2d ed. 1956); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 456, 460 (25th ed. 1974); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 405, 408
(23d ed. 1976).
Dorland's 1951 definition depicting epilepsy as a functional disease was widely cited. See
note 29 supra. However, in light of what has subsequently been learned through the elec-
troencephalogram and other methods, it is now clear that epilepsy is an organic disease, and the
more recent material refers to it as such. See M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY
PRACTICE OF LAW § 24(h), at 103 (1973); Rose, Criminal Responsibility and Competency As
Influenced by Organic Disease, 35 Mo. L. REv. 326, 343-44 (1970).
31. Tonic Convulsion: A muscular spasm, especially seen in generalized seizures, which is
characterized by continuous tension or contraction, but not caused by atrophy or muscular
shrinkage. BLAKusTON'S NEW COULD MEDICAL DICrIONARY 1121 (2d ed. 1956); DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 357 (25th ed. 1974); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
316 (23d ed. 1976).
32. Clonic Convulsion: Spasms characterized by rapid, involuntary muscle contractions and
relaxations. BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1121 (2d ed. 1956); DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 357 (25th ed. 1974); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
316 (23d ed. 1976).
33. THE AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 508 (22d ed. 1951).
34. See notes 70-72 infra and accompanying text.
35. Petit mal and psychomotor seizures may, in fact, evidence an absence of muscular activ-
ity. See notes 59, 70 infra.
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B. Description and Classification
All forms of epilepsy share one characteristic. During an attack, the usual
pattern (or "rhythm") of the electrical impulses flowing through the brain 36
is disturbed by an abnormal electrical discharge. This fundamental abnormal-
ity led Gibbs, Gibbs, and Lennox (three of the foremost pioneers of elec-
troencephalographic 37 study of epilepsy) to describe epilepsy as "paroxysmal
cerebral dysrhythmia." 38  The abnormal discharge may involve all or part of
the brain. Since the brain itself is divided into segments, each having its
respective function, the abnormal discharge may, depending upon which
area or areas are affected, result in a variety of distinct manifestations.3 9 This
result partially accounts for the many diverse forms that the seizures may
take. 40
In attempting to make order out of these diverse manifestations, it has
been traditional to subject epilepsy to numerous classifications. Epilepsy is
divided etiologically into two major classes: (1) symptomatic, or "acquired"
epilepsy,4 1 for which there can be isolated a specific physical abnormality
which irritates the brain and causes it to produce the irregular electrical
activity;4 2 and (2) idiopathic epilepsy, for which no specific cause can be
36. The brain is made up of nerve cells. Each contains a cell body, from which nerve fibers
radiate. Each nerve fiber, whose diameter may be only 1/5000th of an inch, may subdivide
repeatedly, eventually establishing contact with the nerve fibers of other nerve cells. Nerve
signals consisting of minute electrical impulses pass along the nerve fibers throughout the entire
nervous system. These impulses, so far as is presently known, "constitute the physical basis of
all nervous activity and are responsible for all movement, feeling, sight, hearing, speech and
thought." Glasgow, supra note 5, at 277.
37. The electroencephalogram, or EEG, is a device that is capable of amplifying and
measuring the electrical currents of the brain by means of electrodes placed on the patient's
head. See notes 82-94 infra and accompanying text.
38. Gibbs, Gibbs & Lennox, Cerebral Dysrhythmias of Epilepsy, 39 ARCHIvEs NEUROLOGY
& PSYCH. 298, 299 (1938). See also Gibbs, Gibbs & Lennox, Electroencephalographic Classifi-
cation of Epileptic Patients and Control Subjects, 50 ARCHIvEs NEUROLOGY & PSYCH. Ill
(1943). The rather complex and profound terminology can be quite simply explained: a sudden
and acute (paroxysmal) disorder of the rhythm (dysrhythmia) of the brain (cerebral).
Lennox has also stated: "Epilepsy is simply a paroxysmal dysrhythmia of brain potentials."
Lennox, Epilepsy and the Epileptic, 162 J.A.M.A. 118 (1956). This definition, however, has
been criticized on the grounds that "[iut is misleading and might be confusing if used in courts,
since there can be paroxysmal dysrhythmia without epilepsy." Perr, supra note 17, at 281 n.6.
39. Glasgow, supra note 5, at 278.
40. See notes 49-80 infra and accompanying text.
41. ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND NURSING 327 (1972).
42. Although Apers' textbook on neurology lists 67 possible causes of symptomatic epilepsy,
the list is probably not exhaustive. B. ALPERS, CLINICAL NEUOROLOGY (5th ed. 1963). Some of
the more common causes are: congenital defects and injuries, head injuries, cerebral arterio-
sclerosis, and neurosyphilis. For the relative incidences of the major causes, see Perr, supra
note 17, at 283.
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found,43 but which is by far the most common.44 Epilepsy is also classified,
according to the extent the brain is affected, into (1) generalized seizures,
affecting nearly the entire brain at once;45 (2) generalized seizures with focal
onset, which begin in one area of the brain but ultimately spread into
generalized seizures; 46 and (3) focal seizures, attributed to a specific area or
areas of the brain and usually disrupting the mental or physical functions
controlled by the affected area(s).47  One aspect of focal seizures which may
be particularly significant to any defense based upon epilepsy is that, de-
pending upon the area of the brain affected, there may be no loss of con-
sciousness.4
8
Perhaps the most important classification of epilepsy, however, is that
which delineates the various forms of seizures brought about by different
electrical discharges. It is important to note that the various forms may ap-
pear alone, or in combination, and that individuals may be vulnerable to
different types of seizures at different times. 49 Though there are many
forms of seizures, only four are of any significant medico-legal interest: grand
mal, petit mal, psychomotor, and furor attacks.
1. Grand Mal Seizures
Grand mal seizures present the most dramatic manifestation of epilepsy.
They occur in most cases of epilepsy, either alone or in combination with
43. The traditional idiopathic/symptomatic dichotomy may be losing support, however, be-
cause of increasing recognition of the many etiological factors which contribute to causing
epilepsy. See note 42 supra.
44. A 1956 study indicated that it constituted approximately three out of four cases.
Livingston, Etiologic Factors in Adult Convulsions, 254 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1215 (1956). A
more recent study, however, implies that the incidence is approximately one out of three cases.
Freytag & Lindenberg, 294 Medicolegal Autopsies of Epileptics, 78 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY 274,
282 (1964).
45. Such seizures are evidenced by an EEG discharge appearing simultaneously or succes-
sively from the electrodes over both the two hemispheres of the brain.
46. "Partial or focal seizures may spread to other parts of the brain and become generalized
convulsive episodes or major motor seizures. This process, called secondary generalization, is
recognized as a separate entity." Bruya & Bolin, supra note 6, at 391.
47. SIGNS AND SYMPToMs: APPLIED PATHOLOGIC PHYSIOLOGY AND CLINICAL INTERPRE-
TATION 635, 637, 638 (4th ed. C. MacBryde ed. 1964). The importance of such seizures is that
they are often indicia of a localized pathology in the brain, and thus most frequently indicate
symptomatic epilepsy. Perr, supra note 17, at 284-85, citing Livingston, Etiologic Factors in
Adult Convulsions, 254 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211 (1956). This should not be taken to mean,
however, that there is any correlation between the idiopathic/symptomatic and generalized/focal
dichotomies.
48. As, for instance, where only visual, auditory, or motor control is disrupted. See also
notes 70-72 infra and accompanying text.
49. Variations in manifestations of epilepsy depend, most of all, upon whether the person is
a symptomatic or idiopathic epileptic and, if the former, upon the nature of the causal factors
involved. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
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other manifestations. If grand mal seizures are observed by a physician, they
are conclusive evidence of epilepsy, since they differ symptomatically and
pathologically from other conditions.50 The typical seizure is sometimes
commenced by an aura5l which lasts several seconds and is followed im-
mediately by the tonic 52 and clonic 53 phases of convulsion. As the spasms
subside into a postconvulsive coma,M the epileptic may sleep for one or two
hours. Upon awakening, the individual is entirely amnesic as to the events
of the entire period, excepting possibly the aura. He may also suffer from
some degree of continuing confusion, ranging from slight befuddlement to
complete automatism (mindless action). Such confused conditions are more
50. Because various symptoms are involuntary (e.g., absence of tendoneal reflexes, dilation
of pupils), a trained observer can readily discern chicanery.
51. Aurae are experienced by approximately one half of the individuals who suffer grand mal
attacks. Although commonly considered to be warnings that precede oncoming attacks, they are
"not really... premonitions but the first manifestations of the neuronal discharge." A. NOYES,
supra note 5, at 263.
Aurae may take different forms. Sometimes they are sensory, the most common being
an unpleasant sensation in the epigastrium (i.e., the upper abdominal region overlying the
stomach) which spreads upward through the body, and/or disturbances of the special senses
(e.g., flashes of light, noises, or smells). The aurae may also be physical, taking the form of
twitching or rigidity of certain muscles. BLAcK'S MEDICAL DIcboNARY 73 (30th ed. 1974);
BLAcKIsToN's NEW GOULD MEDICAL DIcboNARY 125 (2d ed. 1956); STEDmAN'S MEDICAL
DicIoNARY 142 (23d ed. 1976). However, the form of an individual epileptic's aura generally
does not change. M. GUTrrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 161 (1952).
It has been stated more recently that aurae do not occur with true grand mal seizures
(which are said to entail immediate loss of consciousness) but are associated instead with what is
referred to as "secondary generalization," i.e., generalized seizures with focal onset. Bruya &
Bolin, supra note 6, at 389. See also note 46 supra and accompanying text.
52. During the tonic phase, the epileptic suffers a sudden and complete loss of conscious-
ness and, as he or she falls, the entire voluntary musculature goes into continuous (tonic) con-
traction, lasting between ten and twenty seconds.
The muscles of the chest often contract at the same time as do those of the larynx;
air is thereby forcibly expelled and results in the peculiar sound known as the
epileptic cry. At first the face is pale, but as the muscles rigidly contract, the super-
ficial veins become engorged. At the same time the chest becomes fixed and the
aeration of the blood ceases, thus adding to the cyanosis (bluish-purple discolora-
tion) of the face. During this tonic phase and for a variable period afterward, the
pupils are dilated and do not react to light, and the corneal reflex is absent. The
Babinski reflex is present, and the tendon reflexes are absent or decreased. During
the general muscular contraction, the bladder is often emptied and occasionally the
rectum.
A. NoYEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 263 (7th ed. 1968).
53. During the clonic phase, the continuous contractions of the tonic phase subside into
rapid alternatifig (clonic) contractions and relaxations. The contractions gradually become less
frequent. "If at this time the tongue happens to fall between the teeth during a relaxation, it
may be bitten when a clonic contraction follows. As respiration returns, the saliva, which could
not be swallowed, may become intermixed with air and thus appears in a foam, perhaps tinged
with blood." id.
54. The coma is evidenced by rigidity of the pupils, absence of tendoneal reflexes, muscular
flaccidity, cyanosis of the lips, and stertorous respiration (wherein breathing through the nose
and mouth simultaneously results in a sound caused by vibration of the soft palate). Id.
[Vol. 27:771
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common in men than in women, and may continue for several days following
especially severe or repeated convulsions. 55
2. Petit Mal Seizures
Petit mal seizures are usually restricted to childhood, 56 but occur much
more frequently than grand mal attacks. 57 Although the details of petit mal
seizures vary widely among individual epileptics, they are all characterized
by an abrupt onset and termination, brief duration (5-30 seconds),58 and loss
of consciousness. 59 After the attack subsides, consciousness returns and the
individual usually resumes what he or she was doing. There is no period of
confusion, 60 and most persons realize that a seizure has occurred. 61 There is
no memory, however, of what happened during the seizure.
3. Psychomotor Seizures
Psychomotor seizures (also known as "temporal lobe epilepsy" due to the
focus of the electrical discharge) 62 are undoubtedly the form of attack most
55. Continued convulsions constitute a condition known as grand mal status, or status
epilepticus, which is extremely dangerous and often fatal.
56. Petit mal seizures usually begin between the ages of four and eight and, by the age of
eighteen, tend to dissipate, often being joined or superceded by other forms of seizures, espe-
cially grand mal. It has been stated that two-thirds of all children experiencing petit mal sei-
zures later develop grand mal. A. NOYES, supra note 52, at 265. A more recent study, how-
ever, would place this figure at less than 50%. Bruya & Bolin, Epilepsy: A Controllable Disease,
76 AM. J. NURSING, 388, 390 (1976).
57. Petit mal seizures have been known to occur as often as 10 to 500 times per day. Perr,
supra note 17, at 284.
58. A. NOYES, supra note 52, at 265. The lapse of consciousness has also been said to last
10-15 seconds. Perr, supra note 17, at 284.
59. When the attack occurs, the individual, if standing, remains erect. "He may become
pale, with his posture fixed, his eyes staring and expressionless; his attention cannot be secured;
he may suspend his occupation and, through loss of muscle tone, drop whatever article may be
in his hand." A. NOYES, supra note 52, at 265. The lapse may also be accompanied by facial
twitches and/or jerking of the limbs. MacBryde, supra note 47, at 636; A. NoYEs, supra note
52, at 265.
60. Perr, supra note 17, at 284. An affected person, however, may have to reorient himself
slightly to his previous activity. Bruya & Bolin, supra note 56, at 390.
Earlier writers claimed that there was a period of confusion. Mercier, in 1926, described
what he termed "post-epileptic automatism," which followed epileptic convulsions, "especially
those in which the convulsion is but slight, and which are called petit mal." C. MERCIER,
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 116-18 (1926). Mercier may simply have been over-generalizing the
phenomenon that follows grand mal seizures. More likely (and the accuracy of his description
weighs heavily in favor of this conclusion), Mercier had stumbled across the then-unidentified
psychomotor automatism. Such may also have been the case with some of Mercier's predeces-
sors (e.g., Esquirol, Prichard, and Bright). See Lennox, Phenomena and Correlates of the
Psychomotor Triad, 1 NEUROLOGY 357, 360 (1951).
61. A. NOYES, supra note 52, at 265.
62. M. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 103; W. BROMBERG, CRIME AND THE MIND: A
PSYCEIATRIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND PUNISIIMENT 132 (1965); A. NOYES, supra note 52, at
267; Perr, supra note 17, at 84.
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significant to criminal law. "Such seizures may produce abrupt personality
change, confusion, inappropriate behavior for which the individual is par-
tially or completely amnesic, impulsive acts of violence, and, rarely, seem-
ingly well-thought-out crimes against property or persons." 63  The attacks
may also be evidenced by trance-like states " that may last for several min-
utes, 65 or for as long as several days. 66 The manifestations of psychomotor
epilepsy are so diverse, in fact, that they nearly defy inclusion within a
single class of seizures. 67 This problem prompted Dr. William Lennox to
suggest a subclassification based primarily upon three major subdivisions
termed the "Psychomotor Triad." 68  The first subdivision, "psychomotor
seizures," 69 is characterized by distorted motor activity combined with am-
nesia for the events occurring during the attack.7 0 The second subdivision
63. M. BLINDER, supra note 30.
64. These trances occasionally lead to misdiagnosis of the condition as schizophrenia or
psychoneurosis. A. NoYEs, supra note 52, at 267.
65. Id.
66. R. DURHAM, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICAL SNYDRomEs 465 (1964).
67. It is therefore extremely difficult to draw any generalizations about the condition, al-
though it is known that it is more prevalent among adults than children. The incidence of
psychomotor seizures, therefore, is higher in older persons, while that of petit mal seizures is
higher in children. After a study of 1,900 office patients, Lennox reported:
As patients increase in age there is a progressive increase in the proportion with a
history of psychomotor seizures; 9.7 per cent in patients less than five years of age
and 34.1 per cent in those above the age of 40. Furthermore, the greatest increase
took place in patients who had had convulsions also-usually before the advent of
psychomotor trouble. Convulsions had been present in 3.9 per cent of those less
than 10 years and in 26.5 per cent of those over 40 years of age.
Lennox, supra note 60, at 368. See also R. DumAM, supra note 66; A. NOYEs, supra note 52,
at 267.
It is also known that the incidence of psychomotor epilepsy is approximately the same in
males as in females. Lennox, supra note 60, at 368. There is also a higher incidence among
epileptics who have been institutionalized. R. Dum-AM, supra note 66.
68. Lennox, supra note 60, at 361-65.
69. Lennox, however, does not mean to imply that these seizures, as opposed to the latter
two subdivisions, are the only true psychomotor attacks. Rather, the name seems to be based
upon the characteristic manifestation of the seizures.
70. Dr. Lennox identified three further subgroupings that occur during the psychomotor
seizure. The first of the subgroups is evidenced by tonic masticatory movements (e.g., increased
muscular rigidity often accompanied by movement of the head and/or primitive automatisms,
such as chewing, swallowing, and drooling). Attacks generally produce complete unconscious-
ness and amnesia, and must be distinguished from grand mnal seizures. The second subgroup is
typified by excessive muscular or psychic activity (impaired consciousness and partial amnesia).
Consequently, it may often be confused with other conditions (e.g., hysteria, emotional out-
bursts, manic psychosis, criminality, psychotic personality). The third subgroup features an ar-
rest of activity, often accompanied by staring, stupor, trance or sleep-like states, with partial or
total loss of consciousness. The seizures may thus resemble petit mal attacks, but may be dif-
ferentiated by the lack of the abrupt onset and termination characteristic of the petit mal sei-
zure. Lennox, supra note 60, at 361-62.
[Vol. 27:771
EPILEPSY DEFENSE
of the Triad, "automatic seizures," is exemplified by automatisms. 7 1
The final Triad subdivision suggested by Dr. Lennox is comprised of "sub-
jective (psychic) seizures," in which, although consciousness may be some-
what disturbed, there is no impairment of memory: "Symptoms are told by
the patient and not by the onlooker, being subjective rather than objec-
tive." 72  The respective incidences of these subdivisions were identified by
Dr. Lennox, 73 but he warned that the entire classification was tentative and
meant only for discussion and clarification, and not for compartmentalization
of the various phenomena. 74 Later authorities, in fact, have associated the
various manifestations of psychomotor seizures identified by Dr. Lennox
71. Two subgroups are identified depending on the awareness and contact the victim ap-
pears to have with his or her surroundings. Seizures falling into the first subgroup reveal a
distinct impairment of self-control. The automatisms may be ambulatory, or may be "repetitious
manipulations, such as unbuttoning the clothes, or opening and shutting a purse. The speech is
blurred or irrelevant; the person appears confused or intoxicated; his actions are inept, purpose-
less or inappropriate, usually a diversion from what he has been doing. Precision and thought-
fulness of speech or actions are lacking." Lennox, supra note 60, at 362-63. The second sub-
group is perhaps the most intriguing, since the person may undertake complex activities and
appear entirely normal and conscious. Both subgroups, however, are followed by complete am-
nesia for events which occurred during the seizures. Lennox, supra note 60, at 363.
Both subgroups, however, are also quite similar to bther conditions, and care must be
taken to assure accurate diagnosis. The first subgroup may resemble intoxication, hypoglycemia,
sleep-walking, psychosis, and prolonged petit mal attacks (a condition known as petit mal status,
wherein numerous seizures follow upon one another so closely as to create a lengthy, and
extremely dangerous, condition). The second subgroup may resemble hysterical amnesia, fabri-
cation, retrograde amnesia, and amnesia associated with concussion or fever.
72. Lennox, supra note 60, at 364. The attacks, however, must be differentiated from other
similar phenomena: neurosis, hysteria, psychosis, and imagination.
Three subgroups were distinguished by Lennox according to the subjective phenomena ex-
perienced during the seizure: (1) dream states, including feelings of unreality, illusion and deja
vu, (2) sensory hallucination, and (3) periods of mild disorientation and/or aphasia (impairment
or loss of ability to comprehend, elaborate, or express words as symbols of ideas), during which
the individual, although conscious of his or her surroundings, feels removed from them and
unable to participate. Lennox, supra note 60, at 364-65. See also J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE CRIMINAL; A GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL COURTS
101 (1958); Falconer, Clinical Manifestations of Temporal Lobe Epilepsy and Their Recognition
iii Relation to Surgical Treatment, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 939 (1954).
73. Of 538 psychomotor seizures experienced by 414 office patients, Lennox traced the
breakdown of incidences as follows:
Psychomotor Seizures 43%
-Tonic/Mascatatory Movements 19%
-Excessive Activity 5%
-Arrest of Activity 19%
Automatic Seizures 32%
-Contact Impaired 30%
-Apparent Normality 2%
Subjective Seizures 25%
-Dream States 7%
-Hallucinations 9%
-Disorientation 9%
Lennox, supra note 60, at 365.
74. Id. at 361, 365-66.
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with other nonpsychomotor forms of epilepsy.75 Nonetheless, Dr. Lennox's
classification is still a valuable guide.
4. Epileptic Furor Attacks
Epileptic furor attacks merit special mention even though they are ex-
tremely rare and are often depicted as yet another manifestation of
psychomotor epilepsy. 76 The seizures consist of acts of uncontrollable vio-
lence which may be taken to brutal extremes. The attacks are epitomized by
"suddenness, absence of premeditation and of precaution, and amnesia ....
The extraordinary degree of discrimination and judgment displayed ...
often gives the patient's acts a misleading appearance of deliberation." 
77 It
has been said that the condition is limited exclusively to men under 30 years
of age. 78 Any attempt at restraint is particularly provocative of violence.
79
5. Other Manifestations
The preceding discussion is not exhaustive of the manifestations of
epilepsy. 80 For the most part, however, the forms not mentioned are of
little medico-legal interest. Moreover, many of the additional manifestations
have been included within the general symptom ranges of the aforemen-
tioned categories.
III. ESTABLISHING EPILEPSY FOR A
CRIMINAL DEFENSE
There are two prerequisites to establishing an epilepsy defense: first, it
must be shown by medical evidence that the defendant is an epileptic, and
second, a causal connection must be demonstrated between the epilepsy and
the criminal conduct. 8 '
75. See, e.g., Rodin, Psychomotor Epilepsy and Aggressive Behavior, 28 ARCHIvEs GEN.
PSYCH. 210 (1973).
76. E.g., A. NOYES, supra note 52, at 267.
77. B. MALoY, NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASEs 268 (1935).
78. M. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 103.
79. B. MALOY, supra note 77, at 268.
80. Other types of seizures exist, and one of the most notable is Jacksonian epilepsy,
wherein convulsions begin in a localized area of the body and spread out from there, climaxing
sometimes in a grand mal attack. ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND NUNs-
ING 327 (1927). See also B. MALOY, supra note 77, at 269-72; F. METrLER, THE MEDICAL
SOURCE-BOOK 746 (1959). Two other manifestations, sometimes included under petit mal sei-
zures, are also noteworthy: myoclonic seizures (typified by muscle spasms, usually in the arms,
of varying intensity, with no loss of consciousness), and akinetic epilepsy (typified by falling
spells caused by sudden muscular relaxation). Bruya & Bolin, supra note 56, at 388.
81. See Rose, Criminal Responsibility and Competency As Influenced By Organic Disease,
35 Mo. L. REv. 326, 329 (1970).
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A. Demonstrating The Presence of Epilepsy
Prior to the development of the electroencephalogram (EEG) in 1929,82
it was difficult to determine whether a defendant was an epileptic. Although
it is now known that some epileptics are subject only to infrequent and/or
irregular seizures,83 it was a common practice in earlier times to delay trials
so as to provide a lengthy period during which a prisoner could be ob-
served. If, during the observation period, the prisoner experienced another
seizure, that fact would then serve to substantiate his claim that he was
subject to epilepsy.8 It is now possible, however, to establish epilepsy far
more efficiently -through the use of the electroencephalogram and the study
of a person's prior clinical history.
The EEG is a device used to measure and classify the activity of the
brain. "With electrodes placed on various portions of the head and con-
nected to a suitable recording apparatus, it is possible to register an elec-
trical pulse or electrical beat that originates in the nerve cells of the
outer convexity of the brain."8s5 The electronically amplified impulse is
then recorded, usually on paper tape.8 6 During an epileptic seizure an
EEG records the abnormal patterns of spikes and waves caused by the vary-
ing electrical charges. A correlation has been found between certain re-
corded patterns and the various forms of the epileptic seizures. s 7 Epileptic
patients may evidence such abnormal patterns of electrical activity even
when they are not experiencing a seizure. 8 This fact sometimes facilitates
legally acceptable diagnoses without the necessity of examining the prisoner
during a seizure.
The EEG, like other laboratory procedures, is of great significance in
court. Since it is viewed as an objective test, free from the human error and
bias lurking within expert opinion testimony, courts and juries are inclined
to accept the results because of the ease of application and their belief in the
diagnostic infallibility of a machine. "The record with its complex tracings
lends itself to courtroom drama in the hands of an experienced and histrionic
82. Note, The Legal Problems of Epilepsy, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 364, 373 (1956); Berger, Uber
das Elektrenkephalogramm das Menschen, 87 ARCHIVES F. PSYCH. 527 (1929).
83. Smith, Medico-Legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31 TEx. L. REv. 765, 770 (1953).
84. Id.
85. Gibbs, Medicolegal Aspects of Electroencephalography, 24 CAN. B. REV. 359, 360
(1946).
86. Id. at 364.
87. No attempt will be made here to describe all the particular EEC abnormalities as-
sociated with epilepsy. When preparing an epilepsy defense, however, consultation with an
expert is essential. A standard work on the subject is F. GIBBS & E. GIBBS, ATLAS OF ELEC-
TROENCEPHALOCRAPHY (1941). See also A. NOYES, supra note 52, at 260-66; Richey, Elec-
troencephalography, in U. OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (LAw CENTER), MEDICINE FOR
ATTORNEYS: NEUROLOGY 75-83 (1970).
88. Richey, supra note 87, at 78. But see text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
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attorney. In a trial it can become the focus of attention to the exclusion of
clinical data."8 9
There are, however, many limitations to the conclusiveness of EEG
measurements. First and foremost, the test is not absolutely diagnostic of
either the presence or absence of epilepsy. Between seizures, when most
testing is done, 15%-50% of epileptics will evidence no EEG abnormality,
and 5%-10% will appear normal even during seizures. 90 Conversely, 15%-
20% of the nonepileptic population will show epileptic EEG patterns. 91
Second, the conclusions derived from an EEG examination depend ulti-
mately upon the quality of the machine, the technician who operates the
EEG, and the doctor who interprets the results. Older machines are less
sensitive than newer models and lack some of the more recent refinements.
Misplaced electrodes, periods of drowsiness on the part of the subject,92 and
the use of drugs 93 may distort the results and invalidate the entire proce-
dure.
Finally, even if the examination is technically correct, the tracings them-
selves are meaningless in the absence of nonmechanical human interpreta-
tion. The conclusions, therefore, are subject to attack on these grounds, in
much the same manner as are the results of other machines employed in
modern criminal investigation, such as the polygraph and, to a lesser extent,
the breathalyzer. These limitations are not, however, mentioned in an at-
tempt to discredit the electroencephalogram. In cases of epilepsy, the EEG
is particularly valuable as an aid to accurate classification and localization.
94
It may also be of great assistance in determining the presence of epilepsy or
in demonstrating its absence. It should not, however, be relied upon as the
sole criterion, or as an infallible test; rather, the results should be thought of
as corroborative evidence to substantiate clinical data.
In addition to an EEG examination, therefore, it is essential to obtain a
detailed clinical history of the defendant. Examination by a physician will
also be necessary. Furthermore, complete neurological and psychological
examinations may be advisable in order to rule out the possibility that
pseudo-epileptic symptoms are the result of one of the conditions which so
closely resemble various forms of epilepsy.95
89. J. MACDONALD, supra note 72, at 113.
90. Perr, Epilepsy and the Law, 7 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REv. 280, 287 (1958).
91. Id. Blinder, however, writing in 1973 (fifteen years after Perr), has stated that this
figure is only 10%. M. BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAw § 24(h), at
104 (1973).
92. J. MACDONALD, supra note 72, at 114; Lennox, Marriage and Children for Epileptics,
10 HuMAN FERTILITY (1945).
93. Perr, supra note 90, at 288.
94. J. MACDONALD, supra note 72, at 113; Perr, supra note 90, at 288.
95. See notes 70-72 supra.
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Ultimately, however, actual observation of a seizure by a qualified physi-
cian and a simultaneous EEG reading provide the most accurate diagnostic
procedure. During grand mal seizures, for instance, the pupillary, corneal,
and tendoneal reflexes will be absent. Such aspects cannot be simulated, and
so indicate genuine epilepsy (barring the presence of some other disorder).
B. Demonstrating the Causal Connection
The mere fact that a defendant is epileptic, however, is insufficient to
afford relief from criminal liability.9 6  Epileptics in remission have consis-
tently been held criminally responsible 97 and have sometimes been sub-
jected to a rebuttable statutory presumption of lucidity. 98 It is necessary,
therefore, to prove not only that the defendant is an epileptic, but also that
he or she was suffering from the effects of a seizure at the time the alleged
crime was committed and that the allegedly criminal conduct of the defen-
dant was causally connected with the effects of the seizure. Proving the req-
uisite causal connection is a very difficult task.9 9 Even the fact that the
defendant actually suffered a seizure at the time of the crime is insufficient
unless it can be proven that the seizure deprived the defendant of control
96. H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 29 (2d ed. 1965). See People v. Magnus, 92
Misc. Rep. 80, 155 N.Y.S. 1013 (1915); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 224 Pa. 526, 73 A. 910
(1909).
97. Starr v. State, 134 Ga. App. 149, 213 S.E.2d 531 (1975); State v. Pettay, 216 Kan. 555,
532 P.2d 1289 (1975); People v. Codarre, 20 App. Div. 2d 98, 245 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1963), aff'd, 14
N.Y.2d 370, 200 N.E.2d 570, 251 N.Y.S.2d 676, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883 (1964).
98. Starr v. State, 134 Ga. App. 149, 213 S.E.2d 531 (1975).
99. The basic problem in this situation is well illustrated by three case abstracts discussed
by Dr. Seymour Halleck:
A forty-three-year-old man who had always been considered a respectable citizen
was arrested for exhibiting himself. He had been walking along the lake front of a
large city when he suddenly stopped and began to undress publicly. When brought
to the police station, he could not remember what he had done and did not know
why he had been arrested. He was sent to a mental hospital for a pretrial examina-
tion, where an electroencephalogram revealed an abnormal discharge from the left
temporal area. Further neurological study suggested the presence of a brain tumor.
A twenty-five-year-old man had a long-standing history of assaultiveness. These
actions took place mainly in bars and were associated with heavy drinking. After-
ward he could never recall any details of his violence. He eventually became em-
broiled in an altercation in which he mercilessly assaulted and killed another man.
Upon arrest he denied any recollection of the crime. Electroencephalographic study
showed a seizure discharge in the temporal area.
A thirty-year-old man, apparently happily married, was arrested for attempting to
force sexual attentions upon a ten-year-old boy. There was some indication that this
behavior had occurred previously. During the offense his actions seemed carefully
designed to avoid apprehension. He had a vague recollection of his behavior, was
sure that he had done something illegal but could not give a rational explanation for
his actions. An electroencephalographic study was suggestive of psychomotor
epilepsy.
It is not difficult to appreciate the role of epilepsy as a causal factor in the first
case. The patient's history plus the purposelessness of his actions supports the rele-
vance of epilepsy as a necessary cause. In the second case, however, there would
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over his faculties. 10 0 Since most seizures are of uncertain duration,10 ' it is
difficult to show that the seizure or the resultant period of confusion coin-
cided with the conduct in question.
It is prudent to consider that epileptics are entirely capable of commit-
ting premeditated and willful crimes during the periods between seizures. It
is also advisable to consider the possibility of prevarication, since a history of
epilepsy can be easily fabricated, 10 2 and certain types of seizures can be
simulated.10 3  Moreover, a patient who has had authentic seizures may
simulate additional ones.10 4
Various criteria have been suggested' 05 as aids in estimating the signifi-
cance of an epileptic seizure as a causal element of a crime. Such factors
include the following: Does the clinical and/or social history of the defendant
reveal similar types of seizures and/or conduct in the past, in analogous situ-
ations, and was the effect on consciousness the same? Was the crime com-
mitted without adequate motive, or as a result of provocation of a degree
less than that which would excite a normal, reasonable, man to similar con-
duct? ' 0 6 Do the circumstances of the crime lead to an inference that it was
be some question as to whether assaultiveness always occurred together with the
seizures. Even if this could be ascertained, there would still be a question as to the
degree to which the organic disorder influenced the disturbed behavior. We would
wonder how low this man's threshold for assaultive behavior might have been and if
such behavior would have occurred even without seizures. In the third case the
apparent goal-directedness of the patient's actions and his partial recall of his be-
havior would make us skeptical of the importance of epilepsy as a factor. Yet we can
never be certain that his behavior, like that of the case of indecent exposure, might
have been restrained if there had not been a cerebral abnormality.
S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 164 (1967).
100. E.g., in Jacksonian epilepsy there may be no effect upon mental faculties. See also notes
71-72 supra.
101. Although petit mal and grand mal seizures are characterized by sudden commencement,
only the petit mal attack comes to an abrupt ending. Grand mal seizures often result in post-
convulsive periods of confusion, which may last for unpredictable and indeterminate lengths of
time. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
102. M. BLINDER, supra note 91, at 104.
103. In one case, a man charged with murder escaped full criminal responsibility by faking
epilepsy after being instructed on the symptoms by an epileptic fellow prisoner. Hopwood &
Snell, Amnesia In Relation To Crime, 79 J. MENTt, Sci. 27, 30 (1933). It should be recalled,
however, that grand mal attacks cannot be simulated well enough to deceive a qualified ob-
server. See text following note 95 supra.
104. J. MACDONALD, supra note 72, at 107.
105. S. HALLECK, supra note 99, at 164-65, citing Walker, Murder or Epilepsy, 133 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE, 430, 436-37 (1961); J. MACDONALD, supra note 72, at 107-09;
Smith, supra note 83, at 771-72.
106. Motive alone cannot conclusively establish a causal connection between a seizure and
criminal conduct. There may seem to be a perfectly valid motive for conduct committed under
the influence of a seizure, but there may be no apparent motive for a coldly calculated crime
perpetrated during the most lucid of moments.
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committed without premeditation or planning? 107 Did the defendant fail to
flee the scene of the crime and/or fail to attempt concealment of the
crime? 10 8 Is the defendant suffering from amnesia as to the events during
the alleged seizure? (From a legal standpoint, this is often considered to be
the most important factor of all). 10 9 Was the conduct of the defendant out
of character when compared to his previous history and general manner of
behavior? What degree of guilt does the defendant possess, in the light of
polygraph, Rorschach, and other psychiatric examinations? 110 Does the
type of epileptic attack alleged to have taken place correspond with the de-
gree and duration of unconsciousness claimed? Does the type of epileptic
attack alleged to have taken place correspond with electroencephalographic
data obtained by testing the defendant?"'
Because these criteria may create more confusion than they dispel, they
are not intended as clear-cut tests of causation but as guides to identify the
type of factors that are important in establishing a causal connection between
an epileptic seizure and a criminal act.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVES FOR A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Just as the classifications of epileptic manifestations overlap, so do the
criminal defenses available to the lawyer defending the epileptic defendant.
Nevertheless, subtleties inherent in each warrant their separate review.
A. The Insanity Defense
Although insanity comes readily to mind in formulating an epileptic de-
fense, much has been written stating categorically that epilepsy does not
constitute insanity. 112 This apparent inconsistency arises because, although
107. As with motive, however, the evidence of premeditation or planning may prove confis-
ing, since nonepileptics most assuredly commit crimes with little or no premeditation or plan-
ning. Conversely, however, evidence of premeditation would appear to create a strong pre-
sumption against the validity of an epilepsy defense.
108. Caution must be taken when dealing with this subject as well since a nonepileptic may
not attempt to conceal a crime, while an epileptic, upon discovering that he has committed one,
may attempt to conceal it despite the fact that he may not be held criminally liable.
109. Substantial recollection of events has been held to be inconsistent with the defendant
having suffered any form of epileptic seizure, and is considered to be sufficient evidence to
establish criminal responsibility. People v. Codarre, 20 App. Div. 2d 98, 245 N.Y.S.2d 81
(1963), affd, 14 N.Y.2d 370, 200 N.E.2d 570, 251 N.Y.S.2d 676, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883
(1964). See also People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d 179, 186 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959);
People v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 79 N.E. 978 (1907); People v. Egnor, 175 N.Y. 419, 67 N.E.
906 (1903).
110. S. HALLECK, supra note 99, at 165.
111. Recall, however, that epileptics are subject to various types of seizures in varying com-
binations.
112. See generally Ellis v. United States, 274 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1959); Gann v. Cough, 79
F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ca. 1948); People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943);
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"the defense of insanity [is] one most proper to be urged," Ii3 the condition
of epilepsy does not itself imply continuing insanity. Rather, "epilepsy may
cause insanity, but does not constitute it, and the two should not be con-
founded." 11 4  During periods of remission, the epileptic is completely
sane,"15 and it is only the effects of a seizure which deprive him or her of
any powers or faculties necessary for criminal responsibility.
The burden of production in an insanity defense is placed on the defen-
dant, 116 usually because of a presumption of sanity. 1 7 The states differ,
however, as to the amount of evidence required to meet the burden. Al-
though the most commonly accepted rule is that the defendant must raise a
reasonable doubt as to his sanity to meet his burden of production, 118 cer-
tain minority rules require only "some evidence" 119 or a "scintilla" of evi-
dence.120  The quantum of evidence required will have a substantial effect
upon the defendant's ability to demonstrate the existence of epilepsy and its
causal connection to the criminal conduct. Once the burden of production is
discharged, a presumption of insanity is raised in the federal and in about
half the state jurisdictions, and the burden of production shifts. The prosecu-
tion thereafter assumes the burden of production and must prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt.121 There is no shifting of the presumption in
the remaining half of the state jurisdictions, which require the defendant to
Morse v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 804, 191 S.E. 479 (1937); People v. Syjut, 310 Mich. 409, 17
N.W.2d 232 (1945); Beattie v. Bower, 290 Mich. 517, 287 N.W. 900 (1939); Oborn v. State, 143
Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737 (1910); H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRINAL DEFENSE
35-37 (1954); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 90 (R. Anderson ed. 1957);
Smith, Medico-Legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31 TEx. L. REV. 765 (1953); Note, The Legal Problems
of Epilepsy, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 364 (1956).
113. People v. Barber, 115 N.Y. 475, 489, 22 N.E. 182, 187 (1889). See also People v.
Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 207-08, 211, 79 N.E. 978, 981-82, 983 (1907).
114. Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 276, 126 N.W. 737, 748 (1910).
115. Id. See also note 97 supra and accompanying text.
Epilepsy is not to be regarded as a form of insanity in the sense that a person thus
afflicted can be said to be permanently insane, for there may be little or no mental
aberration in the intervals between the attacks; but epilepsy may cause insanity,
and temporary insanity, in some cases, follows the paroxysms, varying in different
instances from the slightest alienation to most violent mania, the latter form of the
affection being known as "epileptic fury;" and, while it lasts, it may be considered
as a state of insanity, during which the patient is deprived of reason and judgment.
44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 2, at 29 (1945).
116. For cases in all jurisdictions, see H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 214 n.1 (1954).
117. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
118. See, e.g., Lilly v. People, 148 Ill. 467, 36 N.E. 95 (1898).
119. Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956); Torske v. State, 123 Neb. 161,
242 N.W. 408 (1932).
120. Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951); In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp.
18 (D.D.C. 1957).
121. H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 116, at 241-72. See also Comment, Insanity-The Burden of
Proof, 30 LA. L. REv. 117, 117-18 n.2 (1969). The American Law Institute views insanity as an
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establish insanity as an exculpatory circumstance. 122  The standard, how-
ever, is to require a showing of insanity by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 123
A further limitation on the insanity defense is that "the presumption of
insanity will arise . . . only if the defendant can prove he was insane re-
cently enough to warrant the inference that the insanity continued to the
time of the crime." 124 This may pose some problems, since not only may
epileptic attacks be both infrequent and irregular,1 25 but the epileptic may
be completely sane until the very moment of the attack. Furthermore, many
jurisdictions have held unrealistically that the presumption of insanity will
not arise unless the insanity is shown to be a permanent or chronic condi-
tion, as opposed to a temporary or recurrent one.1 26  "It is not at all clear,
however, which forms of insanity will be deemed permanent and which
temporary or recurrent." 127 For example, the rule in a number of states is
that if the defendant provides proof of epileptic seizures the insanity instruc-
tion must be given. 128  In states which require that insanity must be a per-
manent condition, it might be plausible to argue that epilepsy is a chronic
affliction ' 29 marked by lengthy periods of lucidity, because, logically, a per-
son who has epilepsy is epileptic even when he is not suffering a seizure.
Such reasoning may explain why, in some of these jurisdictions, the re-
quirement that insanity be a permanent condition is satisfied even if the
defendant suffers only intermittent attacks, once the presumption that the
defendant was sane at the time of the allegedly criminal acts has been rebut-
affirmative defense, and this would appear to mean that, once evidence of insanity is admitted,
it must be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. MODEL PENAL CODE §§
4.03(1), 1.12(2) (Official Draft, 1962).
122. H. WEHmOFEN, supra note 116.
123. The latter position differs from the Supreme Court's decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952), which upheld a statute requiring that insanity be proven beyond a reasonable.
doubt. The Supreme Court's position in Leland is rather tenuous today, however, in the light of
its holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that "the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
124. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 115 (1967).
125. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
126. Grammer v. State, 239 Ala. 633, 196 So. 268 (1940); People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795,
394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 335 P.2d 657 (1959);
People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954); Hixon v. State, 165 So. 2d 436 (Fla. App.
1964); People v. Robinson, 22 Ill. 2d 150, 174 N.E.2d 820 (1961). See also cases cited in A.
GOLDSTEN, supra note 124, at 117 n.16.
127. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 117.
128. Id.
129. Epilepsy cannot truly be said to be a permanent condition since it is not necessarily a
lifelong affliction. It should be referred to by the somewhat less absolute adjective, "chronic."
Lennox, in fact, reported that, of persons suffering from epilepsy, 23% will have a spontaneous
cessation of symptoms within one to five years, and another 6% will cease having seizures after
five years. Perr, supra note 90, at 285.
197
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ted. 130  However, both this presumption and its opposite' 31 have been
criticized as too broad: "The question on which the presumption should turn
is whether this defendant, suffering from a disease having certain charac-
teristics, was probably lucid at the time the crime took place." 132
Although the standard of proof and the distribution of the burden of
proof may be troublesome, the success of an insanity defense based on
epilepsy may ultimately depend upon which test of insanity is applied. Four
tests are employed in the United States today: the M'Naghten test, the ir-
resistable impulse test, the product test, and the substantial capacity test.
1. The M'Naghten "Right-Wrong" Test
The "right-wrong" test was formulated in an 1843 advisory opinion in
M'Naghten's Case,133 and it remains the most prevalent test for insanity in
the United States. 134 To establish insanity under M'Naghten, it must be
shown that, "at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."' 35  Although the
precise wording of the test may vary from one jurisdiction to another, five
major problems are encountered under almost all formulations.
Firstly, M'Naghten requires that the abnormal mental state be shown to
have existed at the time of the commission of the offense. It is thus neces-
sary to establish that the seizure and/or its consequences occurred coinciden-
tally with the alleged criminal conduct.' 36
Secondly, it must be established that epilepsy is a "disease of the mind."
Since the test so strongly emphasizes the cognitive aspects of consciousness,
some commentators have suggested that only certain forms of psychoses will
130. See generally State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St. 2d 106, 285 N.E.2d 751 (1972); State v.
Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439 (1964); State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948). See also cases cited in A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 117 n.17.
131. See generally Robinson v. United States, 420 F.2d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Putnam v. State, 227 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Brady v. State, 190 S. 2d 607 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966); State v. Elsea, 251 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. 1952); State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo.
193, 101 S.W. 27 (1907); Murray v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 474, 182 S.W.2d 475 (Crim. App.
1944); Kizer v. State, 92 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936).
132. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 117 (emphasis original).
133. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (C.A. 1843). Although the modem version of the right-wrong test is
associated with M7Naghten's Case, where it was first stated, the test had been applied earlier.
See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 275 n.7 (1972); Earl Ferrer's Case, 19 Howell St.
Tr. 886 (1760); Rex. v. Arnold, 16 Howell St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724).
134. More than half of American jurisdictions apply it as the sole standard. A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 124, at 45; Moore, M'Naghten is Dead-Or Is It?, 3 Hous. L. REv. 58, 74 (1965).
Of the remaining jurisdictions, many retain M'Naghten, but supplement it with the irresistable
impulse test.
135. 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (C.A. 1843).
136. See notes 96-111 supra and accompanying text.
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qualifi, and some jurisdictions have, therefore, refuised to apply the test to
epileptics.' 37 A more enlightened viewpoint, however, is that the
M'Naghten test should be applied whenever any mental abnormality, 138 in-
cluding epilepsy, results in the mental impairment envisioned by the test.' 3 9
Thirdly, interpretation of the word "know" has been the source of much
controversy in the application of the AlNaghton test, and may create major
obstacles to an epilepsy defense. If the term is defined narrowly, as critics of
the test suggest it must be, the knowledge referred to is merely cognitive,
intellectual awareness. Under such an interpretation very few manifestations
of epilepsy would result in the requisite lack of cognition. 140
Presumably, the narrow interpretation of "know" would require that the
subject totally lack cognitive awareness. Knowledge, so defined, would be
absent only in the "totally deteriorated, drooling, hopeless psychotics of
long-standing, and congenital idiots." 14' The only forms of epilepsy which
would render an individual so intellectually void would be generalized sei-
zures resulting in grand mal convulsions or petit mal status. Neither of these
conditions, however, is likely to result in actions of criminal significance,
since the former is typified by violent convulsions and the latter by com-
pletely stuperous inactivity. The more usual case is when a person recog-
nizes that, for example, he is holding a knife, that it is capable of killing a
person, and yet he stabs that person without legal justification. In this case
the defendant "knows" what he is doing in the cognitive sense.
Despite the fact that this restricted interpretation of knowledge has been
forcibly argued, courts have seldom adopted it,14 2 but have preferred to
137. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 47; H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 116, at 119; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01, Appendix B (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (statement of Dr. Guttmacher);
Davidson, The Psychiatrist's Role in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 4 RUTCERS L. REv.
578, 583 (1950); Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 771, 785 (1962); Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L.
REv. 336, 337 (1955).
138. It has been held that M'Naghten's "disease of the mind" will include neuroses, organic
brain disorder, and congenital intellectual deficiency. State v. Elsea, 251 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.
1952) (paranoia); State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109, 234 P. 940 (1925) (senility); State v. Johnson,
233 Wis. 668, 290 N.W. 159 (1940) (feeblemindedness).
139. E.g., People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d 179, 186 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959);
People v. Barberi, 47 N.Y.S. 168 (1896).
140. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 49.
141. G. ZILBOORC, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 273 (1943), quoted in A. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 124, at 49.
142. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 49; see, e.g., State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200,
461 P.2d 677 (1969); People v. Gorshen, 326 P.2d 188 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), aff'd 51 Cal. 2d
716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 729-30, 87 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1939);
State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 469-70, 357 P.2d 739, 748 (1960); State v. Rawland, 294 Minn.
17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972); State v. Eubanks, 277 Minn. 257, 152 N.W.2d 453 (1967); State v.
Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960); State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 110, 319 P.2d
859, 860 (1958). But see People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 805-06, 394 P.2d 959, 965, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271, 277 (1964).
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construe the term knowledge broadly.1 43  The word "know" has been de-
,fined as "appreciate" or "emotionally understand." 144 An individual is said
to know only "if he 'understands' enough to enable him to judge 'the nature,
character and consequence of the act charged against him,' or if he has the
'capacity to appreciate the character and to comprehend the probable or
possible consequences of his act.' "1 45 Under this broad construction,
epilepsy is far more likely to provide a viable defense than it could under
the narrow cognitive construction, since "appreciation" of an act requires not
only cognitive awareness but effective understanding as well. Both grand
mal and, more importantly, certain forms of psychomotor seizures would
most likely deprive an individual of the ability to appreciate the nature and
quality of a criminal act. Furthermore, the confused state which follows the
seizures might also deprive an individual of his capacity to "appreciate."
A fourth problem with the MWaghton test arises concerning the re-
quirement that the defendant "know the nature and quality of the act." 14 6
This phrase is usually taken to require an understanding of the physical na-
ture and consequences of the act. 147 Such understanding is probably pre-
cluded by epileptic manifestations, including automatisms, but the manner
in which "understanding" is defined will be highly significant. 48 Whether
or not a confusional state during or after a seizure prevents understanding
depends upon whether the degree of disorientation is sufficient to constitute
143. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 49, 236 n.13. E.g., State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200,
403 P.2d 521 (1965); State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 148 A.2d 251 (1959); Thompson v. State,
159 Neb. 685, 68 N.W.2d 267 (1955).
144. A. BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYsTEM 143 (1974).
145. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 49-50. Although the term "appreciate" has been
adopted by the ALI Model Penal Code in its test for insanity, its meaning is not completely
clear. For one interpretation, see People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 800, 394 P.2d 979, 961-62,
40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274 (1964).
146. The wording of this phrase varies. R. PERKINS, CmiMINAL LAW 860 (1969).
147. Rex. v. Codere, 12 Crim. App. 21 (1916), an English case, is generally followed in this
country. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 51, 238 n.18 (citing trial transcripts).
148. The problem is well-illustrated by the customary example of epileptic automatism:
A woman thus afflicted had an attack .. .while she was cutting bread and butter
for her children's tea. Finding the knife in her hand, she used the implement in
her automatism, but she put it to a caricature of its normal use. She cut her own
arm with it, and cut it so badly, that she was many weeks in hospital, and never
recovered the full use of the limb. It was remarked at the time, that it was a mere
accident that she wounded her own arm, and that it might easily have happened
that she cut her child's arm or throat instead. A year after the event, the alternative
actually happened. Another woman, in similar circumstances, had an attack of the
same nature; and actually did cut her child's arm, so that it [sic] bled to death
before she recovered consciousness.
C. MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 117-18 (1926). To what extent did these women un-
derstand the nature and physical consequences of their actions? Were they cognitively aware of
the physical fact that they were "cutting"? Did they know anything at all? The answers would
appear to lie more in how the questions are defined than in the mental state of the subjects.
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an inability to comprehend the "nature and quality of the act" (as that
phrase is defined by a particular jurisdiction).
The fifth problem with the test is that the epileptic attack must have
prevented the defendant from knowing that the act was wrong. 149  In Eng-
land the term "wrong" refers to legal wrong, 150 but American courts dis-
agree as to whether the term refers to legal or moral wrong.151 The dis-
tinction between legal and moral wrong may be important if the epileptic
suffers the various manifestations of the subjective (psychic) seizures de-
scribed by Lennox 152 (such as hallucinations and disorientation) wherein the
individual performs the acts due to the effects of delusions and confusion
despite awareness that his conduct is improper. However, in most cases of
epileptic seizure or convulsion the distinction will be largely irrelevant,
since in all likelihood the individual will be totally unaware of any value
judgment attaching to his actions.
In summary, the success of an insanity defense raised in a M'Naghten
jurisdiction will depend more upon how the requirements of the test are
construed by the jurisdiction than upon the form of epileptic seizure experi-
enced by the defendant. Under liberal interpretations of the rule, most
epileptic manifestations will involve sufficient loss of "appreciation" or "un-
derstanding" to preclude criminal responsibility, but in jurisdictions holding
a narrower construction it may be impossible to establish insanity except
when grand mal or petit mal seizures result in loss of cognitive capacity.
2. The Irresistable Impulse Test
In some jurisdictions,153 criticism that the M'Naghten test is based un-
realistically upon solely cognitive criteria has led to the adoption of a sup-
plement to that test. This "irresistable impulse" test considers volitional im-
pairment. The rule allows a finding of insanity if a mental disease renders
the defendant unable to control his actions and conform them to society's
norms despite his awareness of the nature and wrongfulness of his conduct.
In jurisdictions employing this supplemental rule, it is much more likely
that epilepsy will be classified as a disease of the mind, since the cognitive
149. The wording of this part of the test sometimes suggests that the individual must not
have known the nature or quality of his act and not have known that it was wrong. People v.
Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168, 181, 128 P. 798, 804 (1912); Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 311
(1886). Only one, however, and not both, are required, and it has been held to be error to
instruct otherwise. Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N.W. 508 (1899); accord, State v. Moel-
ler, 50 Hawaii 110, 433 P.2d 136 (1967).
150. Regina v. Windle, [1952] 2 Q.B. 826.
151. E.g., State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 357 P.2d 739 (1961) (legally wrong); People v.
Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915) (morally wrong).
152. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
153. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 133, at 283 n.98.
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restrictions of the M'Naghten test are not present.' 4 Although the irresist-
able impulse test has drawn much criticism, 155 "irresistable impulse" is an
apt description of many of the epileptic manifestations.1 56 The epileptic
furor attack and postconvulsive confusional states are prominent examples.
In such conditions, the individual may be aware of his actions, but he may
be unable to alter them.
The irresistable impulse test may be most useful when it is doubtful that
the epileptic defendant can be proven to have been totally unconscious and
automatic. During an automatism,157 for example, the irresistable impulse
test should be unnecessary because the epileptic's total unawareness of his
acts should shield him from criminal responsibility under the MWaghten
test. It is possible, however, that a jury would be more willing to believe
that an individual could not resist an impulse to act than that he or she
could perform complex activities while completely unconscious. In jurisdic-
tions supplementing M'Naghten with an irresistable impulse test, it is advis-
able to argue both with equal vigor.
3. The Durham "Product" Test
In 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held in Durham v. United States,'58 "that an accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect."1 59  This test was to improve upon the MWaghten and ir-
resistable impulse tests by taking account not only of the cognitive and voli-
tional aspects of the defendant's mental condition, but also of the broad
range of mental illness itself. Like the tests which preceded it, however, the
product test is ambiguous and has required further explication. "Product"
154. See text accompanying notes 140-48 supra.
155. Some critics complain that the test is too restrictive, since it does not cover the vast
majority of cases in which an utter inability to control conduct is due to a condition which is
neither an "impulse" (i.e., precipitous and unexpected) nor "irresistable" (i.e., totally uncon-
trollable). A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 70-71.
156. One criticism of the terminology draws attention to this fact:
The term "irresistable impulse" is not a very good one. Irresistable implies that
the person was absolutely unable to resist; impulse suggests an urge that is sudden
and overwhelming but momentary. Such conditions exist-for example, in the irra-
tional acts of confused epileptics, paretics, and schizophrenics-but they are rare.
More common are urges which are not wholly irresistable, and which are not of
sudden overwhelming force. Most exhibitionists, for example, have enough control
not to yield to their impulse in the presence of a policeman. And if they were sure
that they would be punished by torture or death, they would almost certainly re-
strain themselves. Nevertheless, they are the victims of urges so strong that most
normal persons could not resist them under most circumstances.
M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 410-11 (1952) (emphasis
added).
157. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
158. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
159. id. at 874-75.
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has been held to imply a causal relationship, such that the conduct would
not have occurred but for the mental disease or defect. 160 The term "men-
tal disease or defect" is another source of difficulty. That term is now inter-
preted to include "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior con-
trols." 16 1  Despite these efforts toward clarification, the Durhdm test has
met with a consistent lack of success, 162 resulting in its ultimate abandon-
ment by the court which adopted it.1 rs It has been enacted into statute by
only one state.164
Where it is available, however, the test, on its face, seems ideally suited
to an epilepsy defense, since seizures should certainly be considered abnor-
mal conditions of the mind which substantially affect mental processes. Prob-
lems arise primarily in demonstrating that the conduct was caused by a sei-
zure, since automatisms can so closely resemble normal, reasoned activity.
Moreover, although the case law is sparce, there is some doubt whether the
test would be satisfied by epilepsy. In Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 165 the defendant raised an epileptic seizure as a defense to a charge
of involuntary manslaughter by automobile, claiming that he lacked the req-
uisite mens rea due to the state of unconsciousness brought on by the sei-
zure. The Third Circuit held that a statute dictating acquittal where mental
illness caused a criminal act was not applicable, 166 since "there was no evi-
dence that the defendant's alleged epileptic seizure was an evidence or re-
sult of mental illness." 167  Despite the defendant's apparent failure to pre-
sent evidence that the seizure was a result of "mental illness," the court
cited numerous authorities distinguishing epilepsy from insanity. 16 8  Hence,
160. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The "but for" definition
has been criticized on the grounds that it places a nearly insurmountable burden on the pros-
ecution since psychiatric reports will almost always support the defendant. "[W]hile occasionally
one can say that an act was a product of mental disease, one can rarely if ever say that an act
was not a product." Comment, McDonald v. United States: The Durham Rule Redefined, 51
CEO. L.J. 580, 583 (1963). The problem would seem to be much less troublesome in cases of
epilepsy, but the causal connection between the seizure and the conduct will still be an issue.
See text accompanying notes 96-111 supra.
161, McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The requirement of
behavioral consequences, moreover, is said to eliminate the problems inherent in the "but for"
interpretation of "product."
162. Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the
District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 906 n.8 (1961) (citing cases in twenty-two states and
three federal circuit courts).
163. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
164. ME. Re. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102 (1964).
165. 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1960).
166. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 14(4) (1964).
167. 278 F.2d at 174.
168. The court's decision seemed to turn on the fact that the defendant claimed only that he
lacked the requisite mens rea due to the state of unconsciousness brought on by the epilepsy.
Id. at n.5.
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in one of the few cases in which epilepsy was raised as an insanity defense in
a jurisdiction utilizing a form of the product test, the lasting impression is
that the court would not have considered epilepsy a mental illness even if
the defendant had attempted to present evidence of a relation between men-
tal illness and epilepsy.
4. The Substantial Capacity Test
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code presents the most re-
cent test for insanity:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect"
do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated crimi-
nal or otherwise antisocial conduct. 169
This test-has been widely applied170 and embodies the current trend.
The first paragraph of the substantial capacity test draws heavily upon its
predecessors, yet manages to avoid many of their pitfalls. Both cognitive and
volitional elements are recognized, but the terminology of the M'Naghten
and irresistable impulse tests has been improved. One commentator has
noted that the substantial capacity test "substitutes 'appreciate' for 'know,'
thereby indicating a preference for the view that a sane offender must be
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft, 1962). The term "wrongfulness" was inserted
into the 1962 draft to indicate an option in terminology.
170. With the exception of the First Circuit, all United States courts of appeals have adopted
the A.L.I. test: United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Herrington, 440 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1971); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970)
(substitutes "wrongfulness" for "criminality" and rejects the second paragraph); Blake v. United
States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane) (substitutes "wrongfulness" for "criminality");
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc); United State' v. Smith, 404
F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 3,968) (rejects the second paragraph); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680
(7th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (substitutes "wrongfulness" for "criminality"); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966) (substitutes "wrongfulness" for "criminality"); Wion v.
United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964)
(second paragraph not included, but not specifically rejected; substitutes "wrongfulness" for
"criminality"); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961) (eliminates the phrase
"either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or," and adds to the phrase "requirements of
law" the words "which he is alleged to have violated").
The First Circuit applied the MWaghten test in Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48
(ist Cir. 1962), and expressed unwillingness to pass on a new test on the facts presented in
Beltran. Id. at 52-53. In 1970, the Ninth Circuit stated: "Our research of reported decisions
discloses no subsequent opinions on insanity tests by any federal court in the First Circuit."
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 64 n.1 (9th Cir. 1970).
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emotionally as well as intellectually aware of the significance of his conduct.
And it uses the word 'conform' instead of 'control,' while avoiding any refer-
ence to the misleading words 'irresistable impulse." 171 Most significantly,
whereas the older tests were usually construed to require complete impair-
ment of cognitive and/or volitional capacity, the A.L.I. test requires only
lack of "substantial" capacity. As the draftsmen of the Code recognized, the
old conception of insanity as an "all-or-nothing" proposition is totally un-
reasonable. 1 72 This improvement may, however, have only a negligible ef-
fect on defenses based on epilepsy, since epileptic seizures are so often ac-
companied by such a degree of unconsciousness as to render the individual
totally unaware and incapable of control. An epileptic experiencing post-
convulsive confusion or a subjective psychomotor seizure 173 may possess
some degree of cognitive and volitional capacity. In such instances, the
A.L.I. tests use of the word "substantial" may be highly significant, because
the individual will not lack all cognitive awareness as required under
M'Naghten, but will arguably lose the "substantial capacity" to appreciate his
actions.
The second paragraph, limiting the definition of "mental disease or de-
fect," does not appear to create any difficulties for the epileptic defendant.
The limitation was intended to exclude only psychopathic personalities.1.7 4
Although rare cases of epilepsy may reveal themselves to the eye "only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial behavior,"' 7 5 the abnormality is
certainly "manifested" by other, more objective indicia, such as EEG pat-
terns and characteristic physical reactions" An important factor in dealing
with this section of the test, therefore, will be whether "manifested" is con-
strued to include these objective indicia. Common sense, logic, and the
comments of the A.L.I. drafters 176 appear to support the position that
epilepsy is not excluded by operation of the second paragraph.
171. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 124, at 87. See also text accompanying notes 137-45, 155
supra.
172. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This view of the
problem ignores the vast-number of instances in which individuals are not totally incapacitated,
and yet cannot be said to be insane.
[T]here are many cases of advanced mental disorder in which rudimentary
capacities of cognition and volition exist but which clearly present inappropriate
occasions for the application of criminal sanctions . .. . The danger is that if the
test does not adequately reflect the reality, caprice and inequities in its administra-
tion will result.
Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 494, 501
(1962).
173. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
175. Both psychomotor automatisms, in which behavior is always identical (e.g.,
exhibitionism), and epileptic furor attacks may fit this description. Such manifestations, how-
ever, are extremely rare.
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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B. The Diminished Capacity Defense
Referring to the medico-legal aspects of epilepsy, one commentator
stated in 1953 that "[a]ll defenses of mental irresponsibility, to be legally
acceptable, must be raised under a plea of insanity."' 1 77  Although some
states still view the relation between criminal responsibility and mental dis-
ease or defect as an all-or-nothing proposition, 17 a growing number of juris-
dictions have found this view to be overly restrictive and unrealistic. Con-
sequently, they have allowed evidence of mental disease or defect, not
amounting to legal insanity, to be considered in determining whether the
mental elements essential to a crime were present in the defendant at the
time the act was committed. 17 9
Unlike insanity, diminished capacity is not a complete defense; it usually
serves only to reduce the degree of the crime. Thus, for example, if it can
be shown that an epileptic seizure rendered the defendant incapable of
premeditation or deliberation, a murder committed even with admitted in-
tent will constitute only second degree murder. Moreover, if the defense of
diminished capacity is allowed to negate specific intent in cases other than
homicide, as it is in some jurisdictions,18 0 complete acquittal may result,
since there may be no lesser degree of the offense. Defenses based upon
epilepsy may, in fact, offer situations in which defense counsel may argue
openly for complete acquittal (as opposed to "diminished" responsibility
which coincidentally results in acquittal) on the grounds that the epileptic
seizure resulted in such impairment of consciousness as to prevent any men-
tal state, and therefore any crime. Most epileptic manifestations, in fact, will
involve impairment sufficient to justify such a contention.
Even where an epileptic seizure results in a complete impairment of
consciousness and would certainly appear to furnish a strong foundation for a
plea of insanity, there are various tactical reasons for avoiding the insanity
defense in favor of a plea of diminished capacity.181 Under the law of many
177. Smith, Medico-legal Facets of Epilepsy, 31 TEx. L. REv. 765, 768 (1953).
178. See cases cited in Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1235 (1968).
179. Such evidence is admissible in the following jurisdictions: Cal., Colo., Conn., Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Ky., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.H., N.Y., Ohio, Ore., R.I., Utah, Va.,
Wash., and Wyo. The position of the following jurisdictions is unclear: Alas., Del., Ill., Ind.,
Kan., Mich., Minn., Miss., N.H., N.D., Okla., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Vt., and the federal courts.
2 R. CIPES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES 32-36 to 32-38 (S. Bernstein ed., Supp. VI.
1976). For citations to the cases, see id. at 32-39 to 32-44. See also cases cited in Annot., 22
A.L.R.3d 1228, 1239 (1968), 22 A.L.R.3d 52--53 (Supp. 1975).
180. This broad interpretation of the doctrine is applied in the following jurisdictions: Cal.,
Colo., Hawaii, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Mich., Mont., Neb., N.H., N.Y., Ohio, Utah, and
Wash. The following jurisdictions are unclear: Conn., Idaho, Mo., Nev., N.J., N.Y., Va., Wyo.
and the federal courts. R. CIPES, supra note 179.
181. In England the diminished responsibility defense has been found to be not only sup-
plementing the insanity defense, as was intended, but actually partly replacing it. Sparks, "Di-
minished Responsibility" in Theorj and Practice, 27 MOD. L. REv. 9, 31-32 (1964).
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jurisdictions,18 2 "a defendant who is acquitted. . on a plea of insanity may
be confined, with a conspicuous lack of due process, under maximum sec-
urity in a mental institution for a period longer than he could have been
imprisoned following conviction," ' 83 and the treatment available is of ex-
tremely dubious quality.184 Moreover, the excellent success achieved in
controlling epilepsy through the use of anticonvulsant drugs indicates that
commitment is inappropriate in the vast majority of cases in which epilepsy
is the sole abnormality. Consequently, where the alleged offense carries a
relatively light sentence, it may actually be more desirable to negotiate a
plea of guilty and face conviction than to be acquitted by reason of insanity.
The diminished capacity defense, however, allows the epileptic defendant to
avoid the threat of compulsory statutory commitment, yet it would probably
not bar civil commitment if such treatment were in the best interests of the
defendant and the community.
Another consideration in favor of a plea of diminished capacity over one
of insanity is that jurors generally disfavor the insanity defense, finding it
difficult to acquit a person who is admittedly responsible, at least in a physi-
cal sense, for a serious crime.18 5 This disinclination may 'be especially
strong in cases involving epilepsy, since the defendant, who may be in total
remission during the trial, was completely rational up until a short time
before, and soon after, the commission of the alleged crime. Moreover, as-
serting the insanity defense may require sacrificing the opportunity to
negotiate a plea, and if the insanity defense is unsuccessful the sentence will
probably be longer than that which would have resulted from plea bargain-
ing. The diminished capacity defense, on the other hand, may offer a greater
likelihood of success, since it relieves the jury of the all-or-nothing determi-
nation of insanity, providing them with a compromise alternative.' 8 6
The effect of the diminished capacity defense upon the possibility of
complete acquittal is uncertain: the jury may, having been freed from the
aforementioned dilemma, feel more comfortable in eventually agreeing upon
acquittal, or they may take advantage of the availability of a compromise
182. See statutes collected in Shadoan, Raising the Insanity Defense: The Practical Side, 10
AM. CrM. L. REv. 533, 537 n.9 (1972).
183. Id. at 536-37.
184. The institutions have been described as "penal holding compounds." Id. at 537-38 &
n.10.
185. Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CruM. L.
REv. 505, 510-11 & nn. 23-25 (1972).
186. The diminished capacity defense has been criticized on the grounds that it will encour-
age juries that are unwilling to decide the insanity question to render compromise verdicts. See
Note, Criminal Law: Defense of Insanity: Partial Responsibility: Adequacy of Present Law, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 283, 286 (1957). Many opportunities for compromise already exist, however, and
juries undoubtedly take advantage of them. Ultimately, it must be questioned whether com-
promise is necessarily an improper method if it is the only manner in which the punishment
can be made to fit the "crime" (or lack of it).
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verdict to avoid acquitting a defendant whom they believe has committed a
crime, regardless of his mental condition.
Another tactical reason for avoiding the insanity defense is that such a
defense may require a special plea or special notification prior to being
raised at trial 18 7 and can be lost if such requirements are not met. Special
pleadings or notice requirements, however, are seldom required for the di-
minished capacity defense.' 8
Nevertheless, the diminished capacity defense does entail some risk. A
jury faced with the compromise situation above may well opt to convict the
defendant of a lesser offense. It may thus be anathema for a defendant who
was completely unconscious at the time of his actions to accept any respon-
sibility for a crime, diminished though the responsibility may be, when he
would in fact be entitled to a finding of complete nonresponsibility.
The defense appears most valuable if the defendant acted in a postcon-
vulsive -confusional state or during a psychomotor or furor attack in which
some degree of consciousness was retained. If the defendant has some mem-
ory of the events, it may also be useful to argue diminished capacity to avoid
the occasional presumption that substantial recollection is inconsistent with
the defendant's having suffered an epileptic attack. 18 9
C. The Involuntary Act Defenses
For an act to be considered criminal, there must be evidence of ai actus
reus (a voluntary act which is proscribed by law) and mens rea (a mental
state that renders the actor blameworthy).1 90 Insanity and diminished
capacity are defenses to criminal responsibility if mens rea was wholly or
partially absent when the alleged crime was committed. An involuntary act
defense negates criminal liability by removing the actus reus.
Defenses such as unconsciousness, automatism, and somnambulism 191
rely principally upon the fact that the defendant's act must have been "vol-
untary" in order to constitute the criminal actus reus. A voluntary act has
been defined as a physical movement that is a product of an individual's
will. 1 92  Alternatively, it has been defined as conduct "which would have
been otherwise if the individual had willed or chosen it to be otherwise.
187. See H. Weibofen, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 357 (1954) for refer-
ences to the statutes.
188. Id.
189. See note 109 supra.
190. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 203 (1967).
191. In discussing these defenses, terminology can become a major problem because the
foundations of the particular defenses are so similar that the defenses themselves tend to over-
lap. Distinctions between the defenses are largely semantical and, for purposes of this discus-
sion, the defenses shall be treated under the heading of involuntary action.
192. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 54 (1881); Cook, Act, Intention and Motive, 26 YALE
L.J. 645, 647 (1917).
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There are those who believe that the term is indefinable, and also those who
take the view that a voluntary act must be defined in terms of conditions
which render an act involuntary." 193
The similarity of the "voluntary" aspect of the actus reus to the "inten-
tional" element of mens rea has created some difficulty in distinguishing the
various actus reus defenses from the insanity defense. 194 The problem is
exacerbated in the case of epilepsy. Although the abnormality is clearly
physiological in nature, it also affects the individual's mental condition.
Furthermore, most epileptic manifestations will involve sufficient impair-
ment of mental and volitional capacity to adequately support either type of
defense. Consequently, epilepsy has at certain times been held to present
an insanity defense ' 95 and, at other times, an automatism/unconsciousness
defense.' 96 Perhaps the best view is that "the two bodies of doctrine exist
alongside one another, offering the defendant the opportunity to prove one
or the other, or both." 197 There are, however, reasons for avoiding the
insanity defense which do not plague a defendant who invokes an involun-
tary act defense. 198 Most importantly, a defendant found not guilty by
reason of insanity may be confined within a mental institution, but "there is
no procedure within the criminal process for retaining in custody persons
acquitted because their acts were 'involuntary."'" 99
Although it would appear that total unconsciousness during an epileptic
193. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 180 (1972). The last position mentioned has
been adopted by the American Law Institute. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (2) (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955).
194. Illustrative is somnambulism. Although the leading case on the subject, Fain v. Com-
monwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879), totally ignores the defense of insanity, the same court stated in a
later case that it could not understand how a showing of somnambulism "would constitute any
defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity." Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558,
567, 128 S.W. 871, 879 (1910); accord, Bradley v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 41, 277 S.W. 144, 149
(Crim. App. 1925) ('Somnambulism is recognized as a species of insanity."). The commentators
have also disagreed. Barrow, Fabing, and Weihofen consider somnambulism to be a form of
insanity, whereas Glueck classifies it as merely a symptom of mental disorder. R. BARROW &
H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 92 (1956); S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 293 (1925); H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 122
(1954).
195. E.g., People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d 179, 186 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Ct. App.
1959); People v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 79 N.E. 978 (Ct. App. 1907).
196. E.g., Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1960); People v. NihelI, 144 Cal.
200, 77 P. 916 (1904); People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943).
197. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 190, at 204.
198. See text accompanying notes 181-87 supra.
199. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 190, at 204. But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01, Comment
1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955): "People whose involuntary movements threaten harm to others
may present a public health or safety problem, calling for therapy or even for custodial com-
mitment .... " The Code recognizes, however, that such persons should not be subject to
criminal sanction, since "they do not present a problem of correction." Id.
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attack will present a complete defense,2 00 it is still somewhat unclear
whether confused and disoriented conditions short of unconsciousness will
provide any relief from criminal liability under an involuntary act defense.
The cases often speak in terms of "absence of will," 20' but it has been stated
that "consciousness has not meant what it seems to say; that is, the indi-
vidual, at least in [cases of somnambulism], need not be 'out cold' in order
to claim the defense."'2 0 2  Accordingly, the defense will be especially sig-
nificant to defendants who performed the allegedly criminal acts while suf-
fering from the confusion which often accompanies subjective psychomotor
seizures 2 0 3 and postconvulsive periods.
The position of the Model Penal Code on involuntary actions is also
worthy of note. The Code appears to take the position, alluded to earlier, 2 04
that a voluntary act must be defined in terms of what it is not. It therefore
provides specific exceptions to criminal liability in section 2.01:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is
based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act of which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of
this Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic
suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual. 20 5
Sections 2(a) and 2(b) specifically rule out criminal liability for actions com-
mitted during convulsions and unconsciousness, the most common condi-
tions resulting from epilepsy. Furthermore, the broad terms of 2(d) may be
read to include the borderline conditions of confusion and disorientation.
The exculpation granted by the conditions in section 2.01 is thoroughly
separate from the Code's discussion of insanity.206 Such separation indicates
that the drafters of the Code consider these to be distinguishable defenses.
200. See, e.g., Aniz. REv. STAT. § 13-134(2) (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 26(5) (West 1972);
IDAHO CODE § 18-201(2) (Sipp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010(6) (1973); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 152(6) (West 1958); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-3-1(6) (1967).
201. People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 118, 142 P.2d 435, 439 (1943), (emphasis
added).
202. Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 645,
655 (1963).
203. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
204. See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Official Draft, 1962).
206. Id. § 4.01.
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In addition, the comment to section 2.01 emphasizes, as a rationale for ex-
culpating involuntary conduct, the possibility that the cause of the convul-
sions or unconsciousness may be recurrent. 20 7 The Code thus seems to take
into account the possibility "that, in cases such as epilepsy, the reflexes,
convulsions, and unconscious states may be such isolated occurrences in the
life of the actor as to render unnecessary and unfair the consequence of an
insanity verdict."' 20 8
V. CONCLUSION
In dealing with epilepsy as a criminal defense, the attorney must utilize
competent expert advice. The manifestations of epilepsy are innumerable
and vary widely in intensity. A determination of the exact type and degree
of the condition operative at the time of the alleged offense is crucial to a
decision concerning the defense to be adopted. In formulating a defense,
special attention must be paid to the appropriateness, in the case of the
individual defendant, of the verdicts, penalties, and dispositions provided
under each defense available. Most importantly, there would seldom be any
reason to use only one defense. It would seem advisable, on the contrary, to
argue in the alternative any and all defenses which are deemed to be ap-
propriate.
CARL D. WEINBERG
207. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
208. Fox, supra note 202, at 660.
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